'In order to displace -and ultimately replace -the archaic and deeply flawed system of password based access control, the new methodologies for strong authentication must serve the needs of all stakeholders in the electronic information business.'
Remember: C = Currency A = Authority A = Accuracy R = Relevance P = Purpose
For the third and final source you will see the address (URL) of a website. Click on that link to be taken to a website. Please review the website as a whole for your third and final source.
To complete your assignment, go to: http://library.uncw.edu/instruction/UNI_library_assignment. Login at the bottom of the page and follow the directions to answer questions about each information source.
Introduction
In the tale of Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves in the Arabian Nights' Entertainments, uttering the magic words 'Open Sesame' makes the door of the robbers' cave swing open. As children, this is often our first encounter with the notion that things of value can be protected by a secret password. A modern updating of this fable, however, might involve the thieves attempting to use a 'smart card' or fingerprint recognition pad at the cave entrance to protect their treasure. They would be wise to do so, since Sesame's secret code, once compromised, admits undesirable members of the non-criminal class.
In our globally interconnected world, in which electronic communications promise to deliver a fundamental change in our social and working lives, questions of security and proof of identity appear ever more urgent and problematic. In a decade, national governments' legislative emphasis has shifted from data protection to defining how 'digital signatures' can be used to certify an individual's identity in electronic transactions. As more personal, commercial and legal transactions are increasingly performed electronically and, in many cases, across national borders, the need to formulate a common standard for electronic personal credentials has become an imperative. In the meantime, however, we face a daily struggle with the scenario of 'password proliferation' -the unwieldy clutch of PINs, username and password combinations needed to use the bank's cash machine or telephone banking service, the organizational computer network and the many Web-based electronic information services that are access-controlled. US technology research firm Forrester estimates that the average employee must remember 15 different passwords [1] . The need to remember -and correctly present -appropriate credentials on demand has become a constant irritant and frequently forms a perceived barrier to wider use of electronic information services. Worse still, those very credentials are flimsy and vulnerable to loss, theft or interception, and their management has become a significant overhead for vendor and customer alike.
The electronic information industry's principal participants (users, librarians, information and knowledge managers, vendors and publishers) cannot afford to ignore wider developments in the fields of access control and digital identification. Each must in some degree grapple with the everyday problems imposed by password proliferation, but will necessarily view the associated responsibilities from a different perspective and hold different expectations. In what we can term a 'continuum of access control needs', some key differences emerge. Users desire seamless, unrestricted access to the widest possible range of resources; information gatekeepers such as librarians require that access is managed according to entitlement to use; vendors and publishers demand that all access to an electronic service is validated through use of agreed control mechanisms [2] . This paper aims to review the major issues of digital identity and secure access to networked information. It will analyse the causes of the current discontinuities in access control methodologies and discuss initiatives originating in both the academic and commercial sectors, together with proposed technology-driven solutions that depend on Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). This paper does not attempt a thorough review of authentication technology; rather, it examines how the electronic information community's primary participants might respectively position themselves in relation to the new era of electronic credentials. It will argue that the only solutions that will ultimately prove successful are those that acknowledge and indeed enact the realworld nuances characterizing the contractual relationships between electronic information users, mediators and vendors [3] . Now that both legislative and technological trends are moving firmly towards widespread adoption of PKI mechanisms, all players in the information community must begin to assess what forms of electronic credentials will be appropriate, sustainable and cost-effective in the new century.
The 'password problem' and its origins
Password proliferation -the scenario in which multiple, unrelated access codes for different electronic resources are required -has become a defining feature of the late 1990s. Many have observed that the early promise of the WWW in affording a universe of seamlessly connected information 'links' has been soured by the lack of any apparent common standard amongst restricted electronic services: some require four-digit PINs; others demand alphanumeric usernames and passwords. Some Web services let users 'save' their access codes upon first login; others require validation at every visit. In many instances, users remain baffled why they can connect without challenge to certain services when at work, but are barred when at home and using the Internet via their local service provider.
Moreover, for those who do place faith in the ability of access control to protect their personal details, the frequent discovery of security compromises in Internet services (such as that which occurred with Microsoft's Webbased Email service, Hotmail, in August 1999), must raise fundamental doubts. The Internet is by definition, a highly open communications infrastructure vulnerable to such malicious behaviour as 'packet sniffing' -that is, interception of information transmitted unencrypted ('in the clear') across the network -which can result in subsequent impersonation if user credentials are stolen in this way. As surveys often show, given the choice, people employ short, simple words as passwords to make them easier to remember -a practice invariably at odds with basic security precepts. The recent trend in Web services towards personalized pages based on users' own preferences has only helped increase the numbers of passwords being regularly exchanged between browsers and servers across the Internet.
Where, then, should we look for the causes of password proliferation and fundamentally weak, fragmented methods of access control? After all, passwords are neither a recent phenomenon nor an unexpected requirement for use of computers. The exponential increase in use of passwords is not merely the result of the huge expansion of personal computer use, driven by the growth of the Internet. Instead, it is symptomatic of a fundamental shift in our use of computers over the past three decades, from access exclusively confined within a single organization, to an inter-organizational scenario in which different firms' internal networks and computers must inter-operate with those of others, across both local and national boundaries.
Just as it was once famously believed in the early 1950s that only a handful of mainframe computers would be required for the world's needs, so it appears now that password-based controls belong to that same era of highly restricted access to a handful of monolithic, unconnected computer systems. A core function of modern network operating systems such as UNIX, NetWare and Windows NT is the management of user accounts and passwords. However sophisticated these systems may be, they nonetheless share a common limitation. They cannot offer a user a digital identity that is universally valid across the Internet; instead they typically control access to the network of the deploying organization. The same is true for some of the more sophisticated technologies that have emerged from the research laboratory to the market-place. The biometric systems that use recognition techniques based on fingerprint or retinal scans are confined to situations in which an absolute assurance of individual identity is required. Cost and complexity -at least for the present -would seem to make these an over-complex solution to the issue of permitting someone to search a document delivery database, for example.
The ability to identify and grant access absolutely by such means raises the vexed issue of individual data privacy, a crucial concern common to many parties ranging from civil liberties pressure groups to commercial firms. How can we balance the need to inspect and validate credentials to use a networked information resource, yet guarantee that their use of that service will remain anonymous? In many cases, information service providers must permit acceptance of a predefined generic identity to establish this principle. As we will shortly see, some of the current methods of access control remain popular, despite their inherent shortcomings, for their ability to provide a measure of anonymity satisfactory to vendor, licensee and user alike.
Understanding authentication and authorization
In order to explore the issues and technologies associated with digital identity and access control more extensively, it is first important to distinguish two fundamental, related concepts -authentication and authorization. The authentication process -typified by a computer system's prompt for a login name and password -represents the intent to establish the user's identity as defined by that system. The related process of authorization that follows the authentication step will determine the extent of the actions the user may perform and which system resources (such as data and applications) they may then use, once successfully authenticated. Network operating systems manage authentication and authorization processes by securely storing users' details and matching them against an access control list that records what levels of system privilege they are to be granted. It is worth noting that the authentication step can be performed using a variety of credentials-checking techniques: the presentation of a shared secret such as a username and password combination, by reading a 'smart card', using biometric tech-'Open, Sesame?' nologies or reading a trusted token such as a 'digital certificate'.
Many millions of computer users participate in this process each day around the globe as they log in to organizational networks or dial up Internet Service Providers (ISPs). It is worth noting, however, that authentication and authorization to a local network is normally the prerequisite for access to the Internet at large, as the local authentication process effectively authorizes the user to surf the Web under a generic identity.
The main issue with authentication and authorization as controlled by network operating systems, however, is the self-evident inability of such systems to encompass the entire global network -their locus of control is limited to the organization's own computer resources. As a consequence, users will thus encounter further authentication challenges as they explore the global network, since the digital identity acquired upon their original login cannot easily provide the kinds of proprietary credentials demanded by other, remote systems before access can be granted. It is this kind of discontinuity that has led many to press for some form of 'electronic passport' or 'digital wallet' that (either separately or in combination) could be used to create a globally accepted identity of the kind needed to access and pay for goods and services online.
Some access control techniques in common usestrengths and shortcomings
The information industry uses the same small range of access control mechanisms that are commonly encountered across the Internet. These include restriction by the Internet Protocol (IP) number of the user's PC (IP filtering); username and password (or PIN) control; 'cookies' (state information saved and transmitted by the Web browser), proxy servers and SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) session encryption. Additional techniques such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are also employed between vendors and customers to provide a secure access channel, but their use is limited due to cost and complexity. In addition, a number of E-commerce services are starting to deploy Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) technology, including digital signatures and certificates, for financial transactions performed over the Internet. Some commercial firms are now securing access to their internal networks using PKI technology. However, as we shall shortly see, no simple panacea exists: all kinds of access controls have limitations and administrative overheads, and the digital certificate is no exception.
IP filtering is perhaps the most widely used authentication and authorization control in current use. It is simple to understand, quickly and easily deployed, with minimal cost overhead. It can restrict access to a single PC or to groups of machines, and scale to manage individual departments or entire sites. IP filtering helps both the licensor (information vendor) and licensee (subscribing organization) in generating an 'identity' for a user's PC that can be rapidly validated against a master control list. The entire process is invisible to the user, and significantly preserves anonymity, since no token that identifies the user more specifically is exchanged.
A major weakness of IP filtering however, lies in its fundamental inflexibility where remote access is required. Users who connect to the Internet via a commercial ISP will normally be assigned an IP address dynamically, rather than retain the same number between sessions. This means it is impossible to identify a remote user specifically solely on the basis of IP address -it would involve configuring the IP filter to admit all other customers from that ISP, which is unacceptable. Proxy servers -machines placed in the communications chain between the user's browser and the remote service -can partially help overcome this problem by enabling a remote user to acquire a valid organizational IP address (that of the proxy) for access to services. However, proxies are vulnerable as a single point of failure or security compromise, and are symptomatic of the 'displacement' of authentication issues that characterizes much of current practice -the problem is simply pushed elsewhere. Proxy servers require users to reconfigure their browsers -often a confusing task for the novice -and will also require some form of authentication, as otherwise they are open to the entire world. Finally, it is not a difficult matter to impersonate or 'spoof' an IP address, given the appropriate technical knowledge.
Usernames and passwords are visible symbols of authentication, but as already stated have a highly limited validity and scope: different services require different access codes of varying schemas: some are digit-based like ATM PINs, others are deliberately difficult to memorize as they avoid dictionary words. The anomalies and lack of common approaches mean that a long list of codes must be carried around. In security terms, passwords represent a 'weak' authentication method: typically they are transmitted 'in the clear' (unencrypted) across the network, and thus there is no guarantee for a service provider that the presented credentials have not been intercepted or otherwise tampered with en route. Many PC users yearn for some form of universally adopted personal synchronization so they can consolidate their password lists; however, this is made impracticable not only by different schemas but also by the human reliance on easily memorized words which are in themselves weak passwords.
It should be understood that password proliferation is a problem that cuts across organization type: the corporate network is just as likely to suffer as the academic campus or the home surfer who registers for numerous Web services. One technique commonly found on commercial Web services is the option to 'remember' the user's password upon the initial login step. Subsequent visits to the same URL will bypass the login procedure. The mechanism here is the 'cookie' capability of all modern browsers, which uses textual strings stored in files on the user's PC that associate specific values with a URL. Cookies were originally developed to maintain state information about users' preferences and selections as they travel through a site.
Although like IP filtering, cookies have a degree of transparency in use, they remain a highly compromised and fragile control technique. Cookies are normally stored within the browser directory structure, so are often localized to a specific PC, requiring the user to repeat the process on other PCs to which (s)he may have access. As well as leaving an audit trail of server visits and preferences, cookies also open up the strong risk of impersonation -unwitting or malicious -in scenarios where PCs are shared. No check is normally made between the current user of the PC and the cookie sent back to a Web server. And, unless archived frequently, the cookies file is at risk of deletion or theft. SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) is a technology employed to encrypt information transmitted between Web browser and server -it is normally active whenever the 'locked padlock' or 'key' icon is seen on the browser's status line. E-commerce sites often use SSL to secure transmission of sensitive information, such as credit card data, thus minimizing the risks of interception. Because SSL can be configured on the remote server, it requires no browser reconfiguration, and effectively protects an entire 'session' of interaction between client and server.
However, use of SSL is normally confined to remote server administration and commercial transaction scenarios, and has a process overhead that may limit its scaling capabilities where very high numbers of simultaneous transactions are experienced. For many users, it may represent overkill, particularly in the searching of bibliographic databases, for example, and is normally not used by commercial providers serving the library and information community.
Public-Key Infrastructuresthe road ahead?
One proposed solution to address both password proliferation and the development of robust credentials for the new era of electronic transactions is some form of 'electronic passport'. This is a token that could serve to validate an individual's identity and also define what access rights they possess in cyberspace. In theory, the token could have attributes such as expiry dates and 'visas' could be added as required to extend existing access rights. Above all, the document should be extremely hard to forge and should provide strong authentication, proving beyond reasonable doubt that the bearer is who (s)he claims to be. Explaining the technology basis for what are known as 'digital signatures' or 'digital certificates' is a little involved, but at the core is a concept of a trusted authority. This is somewhat similar to the nonelectronic world in which we may be required to prove our identity by presenting the original copy of a birth certificate, driver's licence or passport. Or when we hand over a credit or debit card or even cash. Note that not all these documents need contain a photograph, but all must either carry signatures or some watermark and are given validity by the status of the authority that issued them.
Whereas usernames and passwords belong to a more rudimentary era of computer technology, the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that forms the basis for digital signatures and certificates originates from advanced mathematical techniques used for encryption. PKI is full of forbidding terms such as 'keys', 'hashes', and 'digests'. At its heart is the use of a dual-key approach to signing and verifying electronic messages or documents used in transaction processes. Keys are very long prime numbers, and two sets are involved -a private key known and used only by an individual, and a public key, which is published and available for use by anyone. It is the combination of these keys in both encoding and decrypting messages that gives this technology its security (and also its complexity) [4] . A private key is used to 'sign' a docu-'Open, Sesame?' ment for which a code or 'hash' has first been computed. The hash is uniquely associated with the document and effectively tamper-proofs it. An individual or organization will hold both a private and a public key. A received document's validity can be verified by decrypting the hash with the public key and checking against a newly calculated hash from the document; if both hashes match exactly, the document is thus authenticated.
A digital signature alone is not proof of identity, however, and this is where the PKI model uses the notion of a trusted certificate authority (CA) which issues digital certificates to individuals. Once someone's identity has been verified, both a private and a public key are generated for the certificate. The CA signs the public key with its own private ('root') key, and again this combination creates an electronic set of credentials. In practice, digital certificates are files that can be loaded into modern Web browsers, and will be 'presented' electronically upon demand.
In situations where access to a protected service is required, or a financial transaction is to occur, the certificate is checked first to ensure that it is itself unmodified (for example, that it has not expired), the issuing certificate authority is then electronically messaged for confirmation of validity. This transaction also employs an exchange of public keys from both the service system and the CA to ensure encryption. In short, authentication and authorization functions as enacted using PKI technology use public and private key encryption techniques to verify two basic facts: that a message 'signed' by its sender arrives in its pristine state and that the sender's digital certificate details are correct.
Strengths and limitations of PKI technology
As even the strongest advocates of PKI admit, the technology is not without flaws or administrative overheads. Evidence from a recent Forrester Research survey [5] revealed that one of the current problems restricting wider use is the key factor of interoperability: for example, X.509 standard compliant certificates can be issued by one CA but fail to work with another. One interesting conclusion is that the current high costs of certificates make them more attractive for just this kind of inter-organizational authentication role, rather than for highvolume single E-commerce transactions.
PKI has recently begun to emerge from the banking and finance environment, where secure transactions conducted over a variety of open and private networks mandate its use, to more general applications where remote working and employee access to sensitive data must be undertaken with strong authentication. There are some significant benefits in favour of widespread adoption of PKI, principally its origins in cryptography and the established X.509 standard for digital certificates [6] . Moreover, the very real threats of hacking and of damage caused by macro and other virus programs, so easily spread by Email, has made PKI appear an increasingly attractive alternative to weak controls such as textual passwords for protecting access to systems and undertaking electronic transactions. With such significant upwards pressure to move to strong authentication techniques, the digital certificate appears to be the appropriate solution at the right time, provided the interoperability problems can be ironed out. However, PKI will only achieve large-scale success if the technology can be made sufficiently transparent and robust for the average computer user.
PKI trust models, authorization and community membership
Many participating in the information industry as users, librarians, publishers, or content hosting services may
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Business Information Review, 16(4), December 1999 feel that the technicalities of PKI at best limit or, at worst, obscure its potential relevance to their own world, despite its promise to help end password proliferation. In fact, the reliance of PKI not only on a technical infrastructure but also on an interorganizational system of 'trust' relationships promises to facilitate smoother authentication and authorization mechanisms for the modern era of distributed computing. To test the relevance of this claim we must look first at some significant PKI dependencies, then at the kinds of contractual relationships that differentiate the participants in the information community from the world of E-commerce in general.
PKI technology, as we have seen, assumes interoperation as a 'given' in the concept of public and private key combinations used for robust scrambling and decryption techniques. Its reliance upon Certificate Authorities as trusted entities that must be interrogated to verify key integrity raises a further issue: the trust model. Who determines which CA is trustworthy? Does each trust the other, or defer to a higher authority at say, national or supra-national legislative level? Two potential models have emerged -the 'web of trust' (in which CA peers agree to recognize each other), and the hierarchical scheme in which a 'root' authority devolves CA privileges to a trusted organization to issue and validate certificates on its own behalf. Implementing PKI forces us to recognize that the credentials for authentication and authorization will derive, as Clifford Lynch [7] has so perceptively noted, not simply from individuals' independent status but from their membership of one or more communities that may overlap and interact.
Lynch suggests we cease to speak of 'site' licences for information products and services and refer instead to 'community' licences, stressing that our rights of access derive from our affiliations to (for example) our employer, university or professional society -all of which it is possible to hold simultaneously.
The ATHENS initiative
A defining characteristic of commercial information services, whether used in the academic or commercial sectors, is the establishment of indirect contractual relationships between the service provider, the organization that licenses the service, and the end user. This clearly differentiates the information community, with its concept of mediation (librarians as licensees on behalf of their customers) from the atomised E-commerce world of 'frictionless' markets, where merchant and customer interact directly. Whilst PKI developments edge closer to the commercial mainstream, the evolution of the ATHENS project [8] to construct a national authentication infrastructure for UK Higher Education demonstrates how both the inter-organizational and indirect relationships can be modelled.
Developed specifically to address some of the problems specific to the academic sector, including large and transient user populations and diversity of resources, ATHENS provides an authentication management system for information services licensed to UK Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) via the CHEST agency. A major feature is the devolved model of Web-based user accounts and password management, which permits administrators at HEI sites to create users' account names and passwords, and to categorize users into logical groups or sub-communities. ATHENS promotes the practice of a 'single sign-on' -one account only is required for authentication and authorization for multiple resources. Not only academic but also commercial information vendors can make their systems compliant to use the ATHENS authentication database, thus avoiding the need to manage directly the many thousands of user accounts for each site that would otherwise be required. A commercial system that is ATHENS-enabled will forward the username and password combination to the central ATHENS database for validation and receive a reply confirming access acceptance or denial.
ATHENS is significant because it simultaneously represents past and future notions of authentication and authorization. In its reliance on plain-text credentials it embodies the current pragmatism of weak controls, yet in its concept of a central authority database that is interrogated it partly mimics the role of Certification Authority in a transaction controlled by a PKI system. In effect, ATHENS already exists as the embryonic basis for a fully-developed CA that could in turn authorize its client HEI sites to create their own certificates and generate private keys for students and academic staff, for example.
Conclusion
The electronic information sector has for many years simply followed the standard IT industry practice for authentication and authorization. However, as the status quo changes with the widespread adoption by the corporate sector of strong authentication techniques based on 'Open, Sesame?' PKI and dual-key encryption to span both access to their own networks and securing electronic transactions with other organizations, the online information world faces a dilemma. Which vendor will be the first to put its head above the parapet and accept digital certificates as either a complete or partial alternative to traditional plain-text unencrypted passwords? Any such change of practice clearly demands a critical mass of customers who firmly plan to adopt PKI-based authentication. It is unlikely to be a cheaper alternative to the current password proliferation scenario that everyone agrees has long since reached unmanageable proportions, nor is adoption likely to be a unilateral decision by either licensor or licensee, given the need for technical compliance on both sides.
In order to displace -and ultimately replace -the archaic and deeply flawed system of password based access control, the new methodologies for strong authentication must serve the needs of all stakeholders in the electronic information business. Furthermore, the PKI solution will only prove credible if it succeeds in enacting, as transparently and flexibly as possible, the nuances of the real-world contractual relationships that reflect the practical realities of access to information in our modern, inter-organizational era.
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In the second part of New Scientist's special report into the identity revolution, DuncanGraham-Rowe investigates what impact the widespread introduction of biometrics will have on society.
Who will be the winners and losers in an age when each of us is assigned a digital identity? How will our lives change, and what impact will this revolution have on our personal privacy?
IN JUST a few years from now, every citizen of most western countries, and probably many more besides, will be required to carry their digital identity with them wherever they go. Our digital personas will be derived from biometrics that are unique to each of us, such as fingerprints, iris patterns and facial profiles. And this digital identity will open doors, in some cases literally, giving us access to our home, workplace, finances and medical records. It is designed to give each of us instant access to the services we are entitled to, improve our security and prevent fraud. It is an alluring prospect.
But as the story of the fictitious Mark shows (below left), when the technology fails, things can go badly wrong. Of even more concern are the far-reaching effects the introduction of biometrics-based systems could have on personal privacy and the balance of power between the individual and the state.
Fears about the way biometric technologies could change society prompted a committee of the European Parliament to commission a wide-ranging report into their impact. The results are startling. The report, published in February by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), concluded that the burgeoning information society is bringing with it a need for us to be able to securely identify ourselves quickly and remotely. And this, it says, makes rapid implementation of biometric technologies both necessary and inevitable.
The first step will be for governments to encourage the use of biometrics to increase security at a national level, probably by introducing biometric-based ID cards, for example (see last week's New Scientist, p 29). At the same time, businesses and banks will see biometrics as a tool to help cut fraud. Consumers will be attracted to it as a way of eliminating the increasingly cumbersome assortment of credit card numbers, login details and passwords that we need to access our finances and electronic services (New Scientist, 10 September, p 26).
Later there will be a "diffusion effect", as biometrics permeate every aspect of society. And with that, says the JRC, which submitted its report to the European Parliament's Committee on Citizen's Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, will follow a host of legal, political and social issues for which we are still woefully unprepared.
Here's looking at you? Take Mark's experience with his medical records. In future, every time you visit a physician, are prescribed drugs or undergo a medical test or procedure, medical staff will be able to confirm your identity beyond doubt, ensuring that the drugs or operation you receive are the ones approved for you, and not for someone else. Similarly, banks may use biometric technologies such as face recognition to confirm that you are who you claim to be.
But what if the technology fails? Will hospitals, banks and other institutions shut down when the computers crash? And what will happen if biometric software confuses you with someone else, or if someone steals your digital identity? "Identity theft may become simultaneously less likely but more serious," says Jonathan Cave, an economist at the University of Warwick in the UK, who has studied biometrics. Accurate identification will reduce the prevalence of mistakes, but those that do occur will be more serious and harder to rectify. This is likely to happen, Cave says, if people place too much faith in the technology rather than their own common-sense judgement. Much may depend on how stringent the standards for identification are. In the UK, for instance, the government is proposing that ID cards carry electronic representations of the holder's face, scans of both irises, and all 10 fingerprints. But other organisations may settle on a lower standard: businesses, hospitals and banks, for example, may find it simpler and cheaper to rely on automated systems that use just one biometric identifier and lower-quality equipment. These simpler IDs will be more easily spoofed and prone to error.
Even worse are the problems that could arise if your digital identity becomes compromised or altered. What happens when a scan of your iris fails to match the digital ID held in databases all over the world? Every time your eyes are scanned, by your bank's security system, the biometric lock at the gates of your children's school, or the immigration desk at some faraway airport, you will be rejected as an unknown.
Is this fear a realistic one? It depends how biometric systems are implemented, Cave says. For example, the ID system being proposed for the UK will store citizens' digital identities both on a card that everyone carries with them, and in a central database. However, when researchers at the London School of Economics examined the proposals they found the scheme to be "too complex" and "technically unsafe". They propose an alternative system in which the central database stores only non-biometric information about each person, which can be accessed only with that person's permission. Any biometric information will be stored only on the card.
The distinction is crucial. Storing biometric data centrally in effect creates a digital identity that can be accessed, copied or amended without its owner's knowledge or permission. Storing it only on the ID card keeps the owner in control of that identity. "You either see the government at the centre of the model or you see the citizen," says Simon Davies of the London-based pressure group Privacy International. "All the government needs to know is that a person purporting to be an individual is that individual." Theft is another concern. Hackers and cybercriminals can already steal bank account or credit card details, and in the future they will undoubtedly find ways to steal biometric profiles. And they may find that all too easy. We leave fingerprints on anything we touch, images of our faces can easily be captured from CCTV footage, and we leave a trail of DNA wherever we go. As for iris scans, often touted as one of the more secure biometrics, the possibility already exists that they can be spoofed. Samir Nanavati of the consultancy International Biometric Group in New York says that criminals could, for example, use tinted contact lenses to register a fake iris pattern.
While software designed to distinguish contact lenses from genuine iris scans exists, experts stress we must still trust humans to verify the integrity of these scans. Jim Cambier of the leading iris-recognition technology company Iridian recommends that people being scanned should be monitored by trained staff to check that they are not wearing lenses that will falsify the scan.
Ravages of time
Another problem is the way our biometric profiles change as we pass from youth to middle age and beyond. Faces change, fingerprints fade and even the pattern of pigmentation spots in the iris changes over time. This means everyone's biometric profile will have to be updated every decade or so. With each re-registration comes a new danger: the opportunity for the person to acquire a new, fake identity.
Such scenarios are still hypothetical, however, and Cambier dismisses them as unlikely. Simpler, more traditional ways to spoof the system are the more immediate threat. "It's a lot easier, quicker and cheaper to hack a central database than to lift a biometric," says Ioannis Maghiros at the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies in Seville, Spain, who co-authored the IRC report. If internet-savvy companies and banks can't always keep credit card details secure from hackers, then governments are unlikely to be much better at securing personal data, he warns.
One way to mitigate some of these problems is to create separate digital IDs for particular purposes, by applying different algorithms to the same biometric scans. For instance, one biometric template could be created to be used by iris-recognition systems that give access to your medical records. Meanwhile another algorithm could be applied to the same iris scan to generate a more secure digital template for use in passport controls. As well as providing the appropriate level of security for each application, this makes it much easier to revoke a biometric template and issue the user a new one if their digital identity becomes corrupted or is stolen. "This is a feature that we need to have," Maghiros says.
Such systems have already been successfully developed, says John Daugman of the University of Cambridge, who developed the algorithms that form the basis of the vast majority of iris-recognition systems. There appear to be no limits to the number of device-specific or application-specific templates that can be generated from a single iris, he says.
One weak point arises from people's slackness when it comes to safeguarding their personal details. On the net, cookies already encourage us to save passwords to supposedly secure sites so we don't have to remember them next time. The same could happen with biometrics, if people are allowed to provide a scan of their fingerprint to sign up to new services. Already, some hamburger chains are scanning customers' fingerprints so they can deliver burgers to them more quickly. It's a small step for hackers to start stealing profiles from sources like this, and use them to get credit or goods in other people's names.
This could take us into uncharted legal territory. The JRC report points out that there is little legislation in Europe governing the use of biometric information, and other countries are no further ahead. Existing data protection laws do not make clear whether a biometric template should be classified as personal data, so it remains uncertain who will be able to share the information, and whether an individual's digital profile could be exploited by businesses and marketing firms.
It has also become clear that while digital identity schemes will create a host of benefits, they ultimately rely on maintaining the trust of the public. The London School of Economics report into the UK government's ID card scheme found the proposals "lack public trust and confidence". If such attitudes take hold, people may simply opt out and refuse to enrol in such schemes, especially if they believe their digital IDs may be misused or fall into the wrong hands, Maghiros says. Some may be uncomfortable with the idea of being identified at every turn, while others may seek to create false digital identities to protect their privacy.
For all these reasons, the JRC report calls for a public debate about biometrics before their use becomes widespread and unstoppable. Its conclusion may be written in dry, bureaucratic language, but its message is clear. "The introduction of biometrics is not just a technological issue, it poses challenges to the way our society is organised. These issues need to be addressed in the near future if policy is to shape the use of biometrics rather than be overrun by it."
Sidebar

MARK'S STORY
Mark awoke full of expectation. This was the day he'd been planning for, when he would move to Florida with his family to make a fresh start. First he needed the all-clear from his doctor. Then he would go into work one last time to quit his job, get cash from his bank account for the move, collect his kids from school, and they'd be on their way.
Except things didn't quite work out as he hoped. A quick examination by the doctor confirmed what he already knew: he did not have the serious heart condition he'd been warned of in the last report the doctor had sent. The person it referred to was a different patient, 20 years his senior. The mix-up happened when a nurse had failed to scan Mark's fingerprints to confirm the test results were indeed his.
But when he tried to enter his office he found the way barred. The doors wouldn't open no matter how many times he allowed his iris to be scanned. Things went from bad to worse. At the bank, he discovered that someone had got there the day before and cleared out his account. The man must have been Mark, the clerk insisted, because their face recognition scanner confirmed that his profile matched the one they had in their database. It was bad news at the school gates, too, where their iris scanner insisted he was not authorised to enter. Florida would have to wait.
Sidebar
"We are woefully unprepared for the legal, political and social issues that will follow biometric ID" Sidebar "People may simply opt out and refuse to enrol in such schemes, especially if they believe their digital ID may be misused or stolen"
